Sound Decisions: An Undergraduate Bioethics Journal
Volume 4

Issue 1

Article 5

May 2018

We Can, But Should We? A Response to Ethical Analysis of Brain
Augmentation and Nanotechnology
Simone M. Moore
University of Puget Sound

Follow this and additional works at: https://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/sounddecisions
Part of the Bioethics and Medical Ethics Commons

Recommended Citation
Moore, Simone M. (2018) "We Can, But Should We? A Response to Ethical Analysis of Brain Augmentation
and Nanotechnology," Sound Decisions: An Undergraduate Bioethics Journal: Vol. 4 : Iss. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/sounddecisions/vol4/iss1/5

This Response is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications at Sound Ideas. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Sound Decisions: An Undergraduate Bioethics Journal by an authorized editor of Sound
Ideas. For more information, please contact soundideas@pugetsound.edu.

Moore: A Response to Ethical Analysis of Brain Augmentation and Nanotechnology

We Can, But Should We? A Response to Ethical Analysis of Brain
Augmentation and Nanotechnology
Introduction
Science often progresses at rates faster than it can be regulated. Much research has been done in
recent years surrounding nanotechnology, mechanisms comprised of various particles between 1
and 100 nm in size that are capable of altering organic and non-organic molecules and atoms.
The ethical implications of using such technology have been strongly debated among researchers
and ethicists alike, particularly concerning the issue of human brain augmentation. While the
definition of what constitutes brain augmentation can vary greatly, for the purposes of this essay,
brain augmentation will be defined as the process by which an individual’s higher and lower
order brain function are enhanced beyond their natural capabilities with invasive forms of
intervention. Individuals that have no external alterations in the neural development cycle
including neurogenesis, cell migration, cell differentiation, cell maturation, synaptogenesis, cell
death and synaptic pruning, and myelogenesis, have “natural” brain function. Using the ethical
theory of principlism and addressing the points offered in Caras and De Jesus’ paper Ethical
Analysis of Brain Augmentation and Nanotechnology, this paper will argue that the use of
nanotechnology for the purposes of brain augmentation are not morally permissible for they
violate the principles of autonomy, non-maleficence, and justice.
Informed Consent
Caras and De Jesus suggest that treating patients with nanoparticles and technologies for clinical
purposes presents two major issues. They begin by saying that (1) it is not known how
nanoparticles will specifically interact with the human brain and body at this time, and (2)
problems of informed consent can arise from a change in identity that may take place after the
introduction of nanoparticles into the brain. They go on to argue that overall risks of using
nanotechnology would be akin to the side effects one might see when taking prescribed
medications, making the use of the technology potentially harmless. They finish by asserting the
benefits could outweigh the possible harms, further testing should occur before the technology is
introduced into healthy populations, and any human testing should be done for “treatment
purposes” (7-8).
The fact that it is unknown how the human body would respond to the introduction of
nanoparticles would provide a major violation of the principal of autonomy. Caras and De Jesus’
focus on changes in identity post-implementation of the nanotechnology veers away from the
basic components of informed consent that one should consider. It would be more correct to
suggest that a patient would be unable to provide informed consent if they were using an
untested treatment without knowing what the side effects could be for they could have any
number of adverse responses to chemical properties of specific nanoparticles without knowing
the risks beforehand. Additionally, the nanotechnology could influence brain function in ways
that are more detrimental than beneficial and lead to a violation of non-maleficence as well.
While the general biological layout of the brain is known, the function of each neuron, their
neuritic connections, and synaptic regions have yet to be fully discovered. Even if one had access
to such information, the activity of other neural cells, such as glial cells, and the role they play in
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neural communication, neuroplasticity, and neural development is still relatively minimal. It is
possible that not knowing the processes of certain neural functions can lead to a breach of nonmaleficence if nanotechnological, especially if interventions would be used without a patient’s
proper informed consent. Furthermore, testing nanotechnology on humans for “treatment
purposes only,” especially under the aforementioned assumptions, would breach other facets of
autonomy and non-maleficence because potentially vulnerable populations would be exploited
for the purpose of research advancement without any known benefits and disproportionate
possibilities for risk. Consequently, that test population would likely be unable to provide proper
informed consent for such treatment as well.
Justice and Access
Although nanotechnology has yet to reach this stage, implantation of neural mechanisms that
could significantly improve cognitive performance beyond the normal human range could
present issues where justice is concerned. Caras and De Jesus explain that providing neurological
improvements for some but not others could lead to larger socioeconomic divisions between the
upper and lower classes on both a local and global scale. Wealthier individuals would have
increased access, presumably, to nano devices that could make them more powerful and
intelligent which could lead to them looking down on those who do not have as much access.
Caras and De Jesus go on to say that it is more probable that nanotechnology would only be used
for medical interventions and, taking a more optimistic view, such technology could be offered
to those in less developed countries in the future.
Caras and De Jesus make a good point that only wealthy individuals having access to neural
nanotechnological implants that can augment cognition beyond human limits could create a large
divide between those who could afford such technology and those who could not. However, they
do not go far enough with discussing access to the technology when it is used solely as a clinical
tool. Assuming that nanotechnology and its implantation would be costly, it would be unlikely
that insurance companies and federal assistance programs, often utilized by low-income
individuals in the United States at least, would see such use of technology as a necessity given
that there are alternative modes of care that may cost significantly less while still providing
enough effective treatment. In this scenario, there would still be a distinct class division and
disparity between those who could access the nanotechnology for treatment and those who
would not be able to, despite the beneficial medical possibilities that may exist. In addition,
should it be possible that all people in more developed countries could have access to
nanotechnology for clinical purposes, it is unlikely that individuals in less developed countries
would have the same access and resources to use such devices. Consequently, those with the
neural nano implants would receive far better, or the best, care while those without would have
to settle for less desirable and less effective care. Because the distribution of resources is likely
to be unequitable, utilizing nanotechnology for clinical purposes, and especially unnecessary
brain augmentation, would go against the principle of justice.
Conclusion
In their essay, Caras and De Jesus offered many points both in and against support of using
nanotechnology for brain augmentation using a teleological ethical framework akin to
utilitarianism. Using three of the four principles of autonomy, non-maleficence, and justice, this
paper set out to analyze and argue with their specific points regarding informed consent and
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justice. Caras and De Jesus asserted that the use of nanotechnology for brain augmentation could
be so helpful for the user and other individuals on a global scale that the benefits would
ultimately outweigh the risks when considering future application options. However, the lack of
information about how nanoparticles specifically interact with the human body would make it
impossible for an individual to provide proper informed consent at this point in time.
Additionally, should nanotechnology actually become a clinical treatment option for
neurological deficiencies or be accessible for recreational use, the economic disparities that exist
would be further exacerbated. In short, while it may be somewhat beneficial to use
nanotechnology, the principles of autonomy, non-maleficence, and justice must be at the fore
when considering its use to ensure that they are not violated as they would be at this point in
time.
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